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Abstract. In recent decades, philosophers and theologians have become increasingly 
aware of the extent of animal pain and suffering, both past and present, and of the 
challenge this poses to God’s goodness and justice. As a result, a great deal of effort 
has been devoted to the discussion and development of animal theodicies, that is, 
theodicies that aim to offer morally sufficient reasons for animal pain and suffering 
that are in fact God’s reasons. In this paper, I ask whether there is a need to go even 
further than this, by considering whether effort should be made to extend theodicy 
to include plants as well. Drawing upon ideas found in some recent animal theodi-
cies as well as in the work of some environmental ethicists, I offer three arguments 
for supposing that plants should indeed fall within the purview of theodicy: (1) the 
argument from non-flourishing as evil, (2) the argument from moral considerabili-
ty, and (3) the argument from intrinsic value. I also consider a possible objection to 
each of these arguments. Having outlined and defended the aforementioned argu-
ments for broadening theodicy to include plants as well as humans and animals, 
I conclude by considering what a plant theodicy might look like.
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Introduction
In recent decades, philosophers and theologians have become increas-
ingly aware of the extent of animal pain and suffering, both past and pre-
sent, and of the challenge this poses to God’s goodness and justice. As 
a result, a great deal of effort has been devoted to the discussion and de-
velopment of animal theodicies, that is, theodicies that aim to offer mor-
ally sufficient reasons for animal pain and suffering that are in fact God’s 
reasons.1 In this paper, I ask whether there is a need to go even further 
than this, by considering whether effort should be made to extend the-
odicy to include plants as well. At first glance, the idea no doubt sounds 
ridiculous, as there is no plausible evidence that plants feel pain. Plato 
(1997, 1277), of course, supposed that plants are capable of sensation, 
“pleasant and painful,” but few since have been prepared to follow him in 
this. From time to time one does come across suggestions that plants can 
feel pain, but these tend to be made on websites of dubious repute rather 
than in the scientific literature. According to a leading plant biologist,2 
any suggestion that plants do feel pain is a question of plant subjectiv-
ity that the biologist can neither ask nor answer. Because of this, and be-
cause the philosopher is in no position to say anything more definitive on 
the matter, it makes sense to concede at the outset that a case for a plant 
theodicy cannot realistically be based on the pain that plants may or may 
not feel. Nevertheless, we can identify three reasons for supposing that 
1 In seeking to identify God’s actual morally sufficient reasons, these theodicies go fur-
ther than mere defences, which seek only to identify his possible morally sufficient rea-
sons in order to show that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of 
evil and the existence of God. A defence is thus a story in which the existence of both 
God and evil are logically compatible, without any further commitment as to whether 
this story is true. Most attempts to explain and justify animal pain and suffering have 
been presented as theodicies, though I am aware of one defence, which is briefly dis-
cussed below in note 9.
2 Anthony Trewavas, Professor Emeritus at the Institute of Molecular Plant Science, 
University of Edinburgh, in private communication.
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plants should fall within the purview of theodicy, and outlining these will 
form the heart of this paper.
The paper will be structured as follows: In section 2, I will offer a brief 
overview of how the project of theodicy came to be expanded to include 
animals as well as humans, and I will then outline the key claims of three 
recent animal theodicies. In sections 3, 4, and 5, I will put forward three 
arguments for supposing that plants should be the subject of theodicies 
also; these arguments will draw upon ideas found in these recent ani-
mal theodicies as well as in the work of some environmental ethicists. To 
each of these arguments I shall also consider a possible objection. Lastly, 
in section 6, I will conclude with a brief consideration of what a plant the-
odicy might look like. Let us begin with the place of animals in theodicy.
1. A Short History of Animals in Theodicy
Since Leibniz coined the term “theodicy” in the mid-1690s,3 the vast ma-
jority of theodicies have been very anthropocentric in their focus, con-
cerned only with the pain and suffering of humans.4 Leibniz himself ac-
knowledged animal pain but routinely downplayed it, insisting that as 
animals lack self-consciousness, their pains lack the intensity of those ex-
perienced by humans, which are often accompanied by grief and mental 
torment. Having concluded that animals’ pain is not great enough to con-
stitute true suffering or misery, Leibniz (2016, 265) declared that there is 
no question of God having acted unjustly in allowing them to feel the pain 
that they do.5 An even more hard-line approach was taken by some Carte-
sians, who simply denied outright that animals are capable of feeling pain, 
let alone capable of suffering (see for example Lamy 1698, 547–48). The 
3 In a short draft piece dated 1695–97: Leibniz 1948, 370. English translation available 
here: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/theodicaea.htm
4 This was also the case with those who engaged in theodicy avant la lettre. Aquinas, 
for example, acknowledged that animals feel pain but considered this to be morally 
insignificant and so not a problem for God’s justice. See Wiertel 2017, 663–67.
5 That Leibniz did not take animal pain as a serious threat to divine justice has been 
noted before. See for example Phemister 2016, 173–77.
LLOYD STRICKLAND
224  9(2 ) /2021
most famous proponent of this position was Nicolas Malebranche (1684, 
13, 16, and 1997, 323, 495), who devised a suite of arguments to show that 
animals lacked a soul.6 And by claiming that a soul was a prerequisite for 
feeling pain, or suffering, he concluded that animals were capable of nei-
ther. As such, they were of no concern to God’s justice.
From the seventeenth century onwards, theodicists have followed the 
broad paths trodden by Leibniz and Malebranche, with some denying that 
animals feel any pain at all, and others insisting that while animals do 
feel pain, whatever pain they experience does not constitute suffering 
and therefore does not qualify as evil. Even in recent decades, many of 
those who have discussed animals in connection with theodicy have en-
dorsed one or other of these positions. In so doing, they have kept the fo-
cus of their theodicies squarely on human beings.7
But in the last twenty or thirty years or so, and especially in the last 
decade, we have also seen an increasing number of theodicists take a deep 
interest in the ordeals of animals, to the point where there are now a num-
ber of fully worked-out animal theodicies. The motivation for the devel-
opment of these theodicies is the recognition that certain animals are 
capable not just of feeling pain but also of true suffering. This recogni-
tion appears to owe a debt to the animal rights movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which placed great emphasis on the sentience of certain ani-
mals and the need for us humans to accord those animals moral consid-
eration on account of the fact that they are capable of suffering. Animal 
theodicists have taken the further step of supposing that sentient animals 
are the objects of God’s moral concern as well as ours. Many animal the-
odicists consider animal suffering to be not just very real but also just as 
great a threat to God’s justice as human pain and suffering, and in some 
cases even more so, given that the traditional ways of explaining human 
6 For details, see Strickland 2013.
7 For example, Peter Harrison (1989 and 1996) and Andrea Aguti (2017) have sided with 
the Malebranchian view which denies animal pain. Meanwhile, John Hick (1977, 313–
14, 316) has endorsed a position similar to Leibniz’s, allowing that animals experience 
“momentary pangs” of pain but otherwise have a “happy blindness” to their ultimate 
fate, being therefore “immune to the distinctively human forms of suffering.” 
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suffering are not available to explain animal suffering.8 Although a  full 
survey of animal theodicies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth 
sketching the contours of three in particular, namely those by Christopher 
Southgate, Trent Dougherty, and Bethany Sollereder. All three suppose 
that God’s decision to allow life to evolve through natural selection is re-
sponsible for the development for the capacities for pain and suffering that 
some animals have, as well as for the selfishness, violence, and predator-
prey relationships that cause much of the pain and suffering that animals 
experience. The most interesting differences between the three theodicies 
occur in their respective eschatologies.
We shall start with Southgate (2008, 40), who construes the problem 
of evil to be the problem that, for many organisms, life is all suffering and 
no flourishing. According to Southgate (2008, 42), the only way to make 
sense of such blighted lives is if “there is some ultimate good that will ac-
tually redeem the individuals ... concerned.” Although he does not specify 
what he understands by “redemption,” he appears to mean being present 
in the eschaton, namely the time at which creation is renewed as the final 
culmination of God’s plan.9 But according to Southgate, not every animal 
will live again at the eschaton. His concern is with “the eschatological 
fulfilment of creatures that have known no flourishing in this life” (2008, 
16, cf. 87), which suggests that every animal that has suffered and failed 
to flourish will be redeemed, and this as compensation for their suffer-
ing and non-flourishing in this life. But as for other creatures, Southgate 
(2008, 84) says little except that what he terms “simple organisms” (that 
is, those which have “little sentience”) may well be represented only as 
types rather than tokens; that is, a handful of individuals from the spe-
8 For example, it seems implausible to claim that animal suffering is punishment for 
sin, since animals are generally not regarded as moral beings. Similarly, it seems im-
plausible to claim that animal suffering is due to free will, since animals are generally 
thought not to have free will. Note, however, that at least one thinker (Moritz 2014) has 
put forward a defence in which it is suggested that (some) animals do in fact have free 
will, and that prior to the fall of Adam and Eve some of these animals staged a rebellion 
against God, this constituting a prehuman fall which resulted in animal suffering.
9 The idea is based on scriptural passages such as Colossians 1.20 and Ephesians 1.10.
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cies will be present in the eschaton in order to represent the species as 
a whole.10
Our second animal theodicy was developed by Trent Dougherty, who 
similarly construes the problem of evil as a problem of the suffering and 
non-flourishing of sentient animals, by which he means mammals, some 
birds, and “possibly” some other non-mammalian vertebrates (2014, 78). 
In crafting his theodicy, Dougherty (2014, 134) too draws on the notion 
of redemption, albeit “refracted through the lens of sainthood.” In other 
words, the aforementioned animals (along with humans) are ultimately 
redeemed by becoming saints, a process in which they thoroughly defeat 
the evils they have experienced by not wishing them away, by accept-
ing that their ultimate fate makes the evils they experienced worthwhile 
(2014, 114). This will require God granting resurrected animals new cog-
nitive capacities that will ensure they “have ample opportunity in the 
afterlife to develop in the requisite ways, to form a perspective on their 
earthly careers” (2014, 142).
Our final animal theodicy, that of Bethany Sollereder, also leans heavi-
ly on the theological doctrine of redemption. She construes this not mere-
ly in terms of renewal but in terms of a transformation of individuals into 
something far greater than they were in this life.11 Although she does not 
go as far as Dougherty and envisage animals becoming saints, she does 
imagine that the skills and instincts of predators may, in the redeemed 
world, be perfected but put to a  different use, bringing about no fear, 
bloodshed or death (Sollereder 2016, 275). She sees the desire for redemp-
10 The idea is drawn from John Polkinghorne (2002, 122–23), who argues that non-human 
creatures “must have their share in cosmic hope” but that there is no reason to think 
“that every dinosaur that ever lived, let alone all of the vast multitude of bacteria that 
have constituted so large a fraction of biomass throughout the history of terrestrial 
life, will each have its own individual eschatological future.” He thus supposes that 
God accords significance to the type rather than the token, such that there will be lions 
in the world to come but not every lion that has ever lived.
11 “The nature of redemption is not simply the renewal of individuals to their former 
nature, but the transformation of individuals into something far greater than they ever 
were.” Sollereder 2016, 275.
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tion as rooted in God’s love, which extends to all animals:12 “If redemption 
is the work of God, and emerges out of the motivation of God’s universal 
love, then we should expect redemption’s scope to be as far-reaching as 
that love. Redemption, for all animals, is not just freedom from suffering, 
but the embrace of a new capacity for union with God” (2016, 275). While 
Sollereder (2016, 276) allows that redemption will heal the suffering of an-
imals, she does not consider it as mere compensation for this suffering, but 
rather as the fullest expression of God’s love, in which individual animals 
will be able to enjoy God.
2. The argument from non-flourishing as evil
I now turn to the arguments in favour of extending theodicies to include 
plants. The first argument, which seeks to show that any creature’s fail-
ure to flourish qualifies as evil, is inspired by claims found in some of the 
aforementioned animal theodicies. Southgate (2008, 63) certainly sug-
gests that non-flourishing is an evil, inasmuch as it involves a creature 
failing to conform to the pattern of life God intended, by which is meant 
its failure to live in the way that members of its species were intended to 
live. Although Southgate does not specify what he means by flourishing, 
or give concrete examples of it, it is possible he may be using the term in 
the way that other contemporary philosophers have, to refer to well-be-
ing (see Belshaw 2001, 128-9) or being healthy (see Kraut 2007, 90). Al-
ternatively, Southgate may have in mind nothing more than the everyday 
“folk” meaning of the term, whereby an organism flourishes if it grows 
or develops in a normal, healthy way, and fails to flourish if this is not 
the case. Either way, it seems that what is intended is flourishing or non-
flourishing in a biological sense, as opposed to any other, such as intellec-
tual or economic flourishing, which are scarcely relevant when it comes 
to animals, being perhaps the preserve of humans alone. Accordingly, be-
ing diseased, or dying early in life (whether through predation, disease, 
12 In another passage, Sollereder (2016, 276) insists that “all non-human creatures will be 
raised, fulfilled, and exalted” rather than merely “all animals.” The focus of her paper, 
however, is on animals that suffer.
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accident or any other cause), would qualify as uncontroversial cases of 
non-flourishing in the biological sense. Now, as already noted, South-
gate considers a failure to flourish to be evil only in the case of sentient 
creatures. Since he does not indicate why the non-flourishing of non-sen-
tient creatures should not qualify as evil also, and since there seems to be 
nothing in the notion of non-flourishing that would restrict it to sentient 
beings, it would allow us to suppose there is nothing to prevent any case 
of non-flourishing, whether of human, animal, or plant, from qualifying 
as evil, which would bring all instances of non-flourishing, even that of 
plants, within the purview of theodicy.
A more roundabout route of establishing that non-flourishing quali-
fies as evil is taken by Dougherty, who expands the notion of suffering to 
include a failure to flourish. He writes: “Suffering will include both physi-
cal pain and mental pain as well as other forms of distress and failure to 
flourish” (Dougherty 2014, 26).13 Dougherty broadens the notion of suf-
fering in this way ostensibly because it enables him to sidestep the thorny 
debates surrounding the distribution and phenomenology of conscious-
ness in animals, debates that are commonly rehearsed in the literature on 
animal theodicy because of the widely-held view that suffering requires 
consciousness. Needless to say, the supposition that suffering includes 
the failure to flourish is tantamount to identifying non-flourishing as 
evil, for since suffering is evil, non-flourishing would likewise qualify as 
evil. As we have seen, however, Dougherty does not think that every fail-
ure to flourish qualifies as evil, only the failure to flourish of mammals, 
birds, and perhaps some invertebrates. Yet as Dustin Crummett has cor-
rectly noted, Dougherty offers no reason for restricting his notion of suf-
fering-as-failure-to-flourish to such creatures. Crummett (2017, 73n2) 
argues that Dougherty’s broadened notion of suffering “would seem to 
open the door to discussing the suffering of creeping things” such as in-
sects, spiders, millipedes, mites etc. After all, his thinking goes, such 
creatures can fail to flourish, and if a failure to flourish constitutes suf-
fering, which in turn qualifies as evil, then this would bring them within 
13 Eleonore Stump (2010, 8) also supposes that suffering includes a failure to flourish, 
although only in relation to human beings.
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the purview of theodicy. Accordingly, Crummett insists that the suffering 
of creeping things is a problem for the theodicist.
Crummett is correct as far as he goes, but he does not go far enough. 
For if the notion of suffering is broadened to include failure to flourish, 
then clearly any instance of a plant failing to flourish would qualify as 
suffering too. That plants can fail to flourish seems obvious enough, as 
plants can be diseased, be stunted by environmental factors, and be killed 
long before their lives would naturally end, all of which squarely qualify 
as a failure to flourish, irrespective of whether we understand flourish-
ing in terms of health, well-being, or normal growth or development.14 
We might even avail ourselves of more detailed criteria or conditions that 
enable us to identify when it is and is not correct to attribute flourishing 
to plants. For example, Kallhoff (2014, 687) claims that a plant can be said 
to flourish if:
 a) it is viable throughout its life, so that it is capable of reacting to external 
stress without endangering its overall performance which sustains its life;
 b) it is capable of accomplishing its typical life-cycle (juvenile phases and 
adult phases which end with proliferation);
 c) it succeeds in expressing the typical characteristics both of a plant which 
has a specific life-form and of a more specific organism, generally fitting 
its species description.
By all accounts, then, plants can fail to flourish just as much as can hu-
mans and animals, something routinely confirmed by environmental 
thinkers.15 And if failure to flourish is evil, as some animal theodicists 
14 An anonymous referee here objects that human beings can “enrich” their flourishing 
in ways that plants cannot, for example by becoming wiser with age. The point, I take 
it, is that while plants can flourish only biologically, human beings can flourish in oth-
er ways too, e.g. intellectually, economically, athletically etc. But even if it is correct to 
say that, compared to plants, human beings have more ways to flourish and to fail to 
flourish, it remains the case that plants, like animals and humans, can fail to flourish 
biologically, which is the crucial issue here.
15 For example, Rolston (1988, 109): “below the threshold of subjectivity life remains. It 
can yet flourish or be harmed.” And O’ Neill (2001, 168): “A living thing can be said to 
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have suggested, then plants’ failure to flourish qualifies as evil, which 
would in turn bring them within the scope of God’s justice and therefore 
make them a proper object of theodicy, along with humans and animals.
An obvious objection to this argument is that it utilises a notion of 
evil (non-flourishing) that differs dramatically from those often found 
in discussions on the problem of evil. After all, many philosophers con-
strue evil as pain and suffering, by which is usually meant conscious suf-
fering.16 The non-flourishing of plants clearly would not qualify as evil on 
that definition. However, defining evil in that way seems overly restric-
tive in that it does not enable us to capture all the things we would want 
to consider as evil; for example, we would presumably want to consider it 
an evil for a human being to spend a lifetime in a coma, even if we sup-
pose that in this state she is entirely unconscious and experiences no pain 
or (conscious) suffering whatsoever. Yet we could not consider this as an 
evil if evil were defined as pain and (conscious) suffering. Interestingly, 
in this example, it looks to be the non-flourishing – understood again in 
a biological sense – that makes the situation evil. Accordingly, there are 
perhaps grounds for a foundational definition of evil as non-flourishing, 
under which would fall pain and suffering as merely particular ways in 
which flourishing might happen to be impeded.17 However, this is beyond 
the scope of this paper.
In any case, if one is concerned by the idea of taking non-flourishing 
as evil, it is worth noting that it would seem to qualify as such according 
to some of the other notions of evil accepted by contemporary philoso-
phers of religion. Peter van Inwagen (2006, 4), for example, claims that 
“The word ‘evil’ when it occurs in phrases like ‘the argument from evil’ 
flourish if it develops those characteristics which are normal to the species to which it 
belongs in the normal conditions for that species.”
16 For two contemporary adherents of this understanding of evil, see Howard-Snyder 
(1999, 82) and Odell-Hein (2017, 41).
17 In a similar vein, John Bishop (2018, 42) has argued for a “unified notion of evil” where 
evil is taken to be “obstacles to human fulfilment,” with pain and suffering qualifying 
as evil only when they prevent such fulfilment. However, Bishop does not extend his 
notion of evil to non-humans on the grounds that they are not aware of the obstacles 
to their fulfilment.
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or ‘the problem of evil’ means ‘bad things’.” And Michael Hickson (2013, 
3) defines evil as “all bad things,” and indicates that “most contemporary 
philosophers” construe evil this way. With these definitions in mind, we 
need only note that non-flourishing clearly qualifies as a “bad thing” for 
the creature concerned, irrespective of whether it is human, animal, or 
plant. As Dougherty (2014, 140) remarks, all creatures, whether they are 
capable of suffering or not, “have conditions of flourishing, and many do 
not flourish. This is bad.” Moreover, the non-flourishing of plants would 
also qualify as evil on the Thomistic understanding of evil as privation, 
since any failure to flourish will be due to a  lack of some good that is 
proper to each specific plant, with any such lack qualifying as evil.18 Ul-
timately, then, it seems defensible to consider non-flourishing as evil, ei-
ther as the foundational definition of evil or as derivable from other, pop-
ular definitions.
3. The argument from moral considerability
Let us now turn to the second argument in favour of a plant theodicy. 
This argument, which seeks to show that God will have moral considera-
tion for every creature, plants included, is again inspired by the work of 
animal theodicists and also that of some environmental ethicists.
According to many of those who have developed animal theodicies, 
God has a moral concern for animals that suffer simply because they suf-
fer. On this view, the property that confers moral status on animals is 
sentience, or the ability to enjoy and suffer, which is considered to be 
both necessary and sufficient for moral status. The idea that moral status 
is conferred by sentience will be familiar to any student of environmental 
ethics. Peter Singer famously argued this way in 1974,19 and others fol-
18 See Aquinas 1947, I, Q48, A3: “the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an 
evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.”
19 Singer 1974, 108: “If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or 
happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience 
(using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity 
to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary of 
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lowed suit.20 However, the idea that moral status is determined by sen-
tience was quickly attacked by other environmental ethicists, who sought 
to develop a more inclusive ethic in its place. It is worth briefly outlin-
ing the thrust of the attack as well as the more inclusive ethic developed 
therefrom, as our second argument in favour of a plant theodicy will draw 
upon both.
In the late 1970s, in a direct response to claims by Singer, Kenneth E. 
Goodpaster (1978) argued that it makes little sense to focus on the capac-
ity to suffer when determining moral considerability. He claimed that, 
once we realise what this capacity is for, namely the preservation and 
flourishing of life, and that there are various other capacities and mech-
anisms that contribute to that as well, we should accept that what really 
matters when determining moral considerability is being alive. According 
to Goodpaster (1978, 320), living things are morally considerable because, 
by virtue of being alive, they have needs and interests, and can be benefit-
ed and harmed, unlike non-living things. To Singer’s claim that for non-
sentient beings like plants there could be no interests as there was noth-
ing to take into account, Goodpaster (1978, 319) responded that plants do 
have an interest, namely “in remaining alive.” Needless to say, on the sur-
face such a claim may appear peculiar, if not perverse, accustomed as we 
are to construe interests in terms of (conscious) desires, wants, or prefer-
ences, all of which are lacking in the case of plants. Goodpaster, however, 
makes clear that by “interests” he means not “desires” but “needs,” thus 
anticipating the distinction found explicitly in some later philosophers 
between “interests as desires” and “interests as needs,” with the latter 
understood as what would be conducive to the good or well-being of the 
creature in question.21 While it would be inappropriate to say that plants 
concern for the interests of others.” Singer was certainly not the first to argue in this 
way; Jeremy Bentham (1789, 309n) is often considered to be the first to base ethics 
on sentience, though arguably André-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval (2018, 231–6) 
beat him to it by more than three decades, in his 1756 essay “On the state of simple 
sensation.”
20 See for example Frankena 1979, especially 11.
21 See for example Frey 1980, 78–9; Johnson 1993, 77. Note that while both utilise the 
distinction between the two kinds of needs, Frey rejects the idea that plants have any 
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have interests as desires, it does seem appropriate to attribute them with 
interests as needs, and indeed to identify “remaining alive” as one such, 
given that remaining alive is a necessary condition for the achievement 
of their good or well-being. If one accepts this analysis then one may look 
sympathetically upon Goodpaster’s assertion that it is life, rather than 
sentience, that is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral consid-
erability.
Needless to say, as an environmental ethicist, Goodpaster’s concern 
was secular rather than theological. That is, he sought to develop a new, 
inclusive environmental ethic that would guide us humans in our deal-
ings with the rest of the natural world. Nevertheless, his insights are of 
clear relevance to theodicists. For if it makes little sense for us humans 
to focus on sentience when determining moral considerability, it would 
make little sense for God to do so either, and for the same reason, name-
ly that sentience is merely one capacity among several for the preserva-
tion and flourishing of life. So whereas animal theodicists typically hold 
that God will have moral consideration for creatures with sentience, one 
could instead suggest that God will follow a biocentric or life-centred eth-
ic, which sees all living things – plants included – as worthy of moral con-
sideration.
Of course, even if one supposes that God would have moral consid-
eration for all living things, including plants, it does not necessarily fol-
low that God has the same level of concern for all living things. After all, 
a clear distinction can be made between moral considerability and moral 
significance.22 That is, while it may be that all living things are worthy 
of moral consideration, this does not necessarily make them all equally 
morally significant, as there may be degrees of moral significance, such 
that humans may have or enjoy greater moral significance than sentient 
animals, which in turn may have or enjoy greater moral significance than 
plants. But even if we suppose this is correct, it would not affect the con-
clusion of our second argument, because the moral significance of plants 
interests as needs but Johnson does not, arguing instead that plants carry some moral 
weight on account of their interests.
22 The distinction is Goodpaster’s; see Goodpaster 1978, 323.
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– even if lower than that of humans and animals – would still be positive. 
Therefore God would have some moral consideration for plants. (As for 
what that might mean in practical terms, see section 6.)
A potential objection to this argument is that it seems to be undercut 
by the creation narrative, where God instructs humans and animals to eat 
plants (Genesis 1.29–30). Specifically, immediately after creation is com-
plete, God tells humans that they are to eat every seed-bearing plant and 
the fruits of trees, and he tells animals that they are to eat every green 
plant. This might suggest that God does not regard plants as morally con-
siderable at all, given his apparent lack of concern for their welfare or for 
their lack of flourishing.23 And of course, if God is not concerned with the 
welfare and flourishing of plants, then theodicists would not need to con-
cern themselves with it either, at least in the context of theodicy. To this 
I respond by noting that, in scripture, God not only allows harm to come 
to those for whom he has moral concern (such as Abel in Genesis 4.4–8), 
but also actively brings harm upon some of them, as is clear from the story 
of Job. Consequently, it would be problematic to conclude that God has no 
moral concern for plants from his command that they be the diet of hu-
mans and animals.24 There is of course the broader problem of why God 
allows and even brings harm upon those for whom he has moral concern, 
but this is, strictly speaking, the problem of theodicy itself, and is not 
a problem specific to plants or other non-human creatures.
23 One might also suppose that God’s instruction to Noah to take one or seven pairs of 
every kind of land animal into the ark (see Genesis 7.1–3) also implies a disregard for 
the welfare of plants, inasmuch as he did not want to spare them the deluge. However, 
it ought to be noted that there is no indication in scripture that plants were actually 
harmed by the flood or that God had to populate the land with plants again after the 
waters had receded. 
24 One could also respond to the first problem by noting that it is quite possible for 
humans and (some) animals to follow a plant-based diet without killing plants, and 
perhaps even without preventing them from flourishing, for example, by not eating so 
many of a plant’s leaves that it cannot recover, and by supplementing with fruits and 
seeds. Because of this, it does not follow from God’s command to humans and animals 
to follow a plant-based diet that he has no concern for plants.
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4. The argument from intrinsic value
We turn now to our third argument in favour of extending theodicy to 
plants. This can be seen as the argument from moral considerability re-
cast in terms of intrinsic value, a term that has enjoyed great currency in 
environmental ethics. In their efforts to push our moral boundaries out-
wards to include non-humans, environmental ethicists have often argued 
that certain parts of the non-human world – such as sentient creatures, 
or all living things, or ecosystems – possess intrinsic value. The thinking 
goes that successfully demonstrating that these parts of the non-human 
world possess intrinsic value has the result of bringing them within the 
sphere of human moral consideration. While the notion of intrinsic val-
ue has been most commonly used in environmental ethics for the purpos-
es just described, some animal theodicists, such as Southgate and Dough-
erty, have availed themselves of it also, albeit in passing. Dougherty (2014, 
139), for example, claims that sentient animals, by virtue of being alive and 
sentient, “resemble God to some degree and are therefore to some degree 
made in his image and thus bear intrinsic value.”25 His aim in employing 
the language of intrinsic value should be clear enough: if creatures other 
than humans do indeed possess intrinsic value then God will recognize it 
and treat these creatures accordingly, by acting morally towards them.
Now while Southgate and Dougherty suppose that only some living 
creatures possess intrinsic value, there is no shortage of environmental 
philosophers who have argued that all living creatures do so.26 Most fa-
25 Consider also Southgate’s (2008, 61) claim that “organisms are ... valued by God in 
their nature.” Note that the notion of intrinsic value has been understood in various 
ways. Environmental ethicists have typically understood intrinsic value as non-
instrumental value, i.e. as belonging to those parts of the non-human world that are 
ends in themselves. See O’ Neill 2003, 120–21. Dougherty does not explain what he 
means by intrinsic value (nor does Southgate explain what is meant by God valuing 
organisms in their nature), but it is reasonable to think he understands it in a stronger 
sense, as objective value, that is, as value that exists independently of human valuers.
26 A more direct route, taken by some ecotheologians, is to argue that certain scriptural 
passages imply that all parts of the natural world have intrinsic value. In this vein, 
see Arthur Walker Jones’ (2001, 94) discussion of Psalm 104, with its lengthy praise 
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mously, Albert Schweitzer (2009, 159) asserted that his ethical principle, 
reverence for life, “says of no instance of life, “This has no value,”” and 
accordingly, he claimed (1987, 57) that all life was “something possess-
ing value in itself.” While an exposition of Schweitzer’s ethics is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we can boil down his argument for the intrin-
sic value of all life to this: all living things possess the same will-to-live, 
that is, the same striving to maintain life and to thrive or flourish, and as 
we recognize this as valuable in our case then by extension it should be 
recognized as valuable in every case. Notoriously, Schweitzer (1969, 115) 
himself often portrayed the will-to-live in terms of conscious desires and 
intentions, such as when he insisted that beetles are capable of rejoic-
ing in the sun and knowing fear and pain, and that every living creature 
“longs for fullness and development as deeply as I do myself” (Schweitzer 
2009, 158).27 Others have pointed out the obviously problematic anthro-
pomorphic overtones of such claims, implying as they do that all living 
things have conscious desires and intentions.28 Yet one does not need to 
construe the will-to-live in such anthropomorphic terms. John Kleinig 
(1991, 50), for example, claims that we
can capture the central thrust of his [Schweitzer’s] position by speaking in-
stead of the telē of living organisms–the patterns of development and activity 
they are structured or disposed to manifest and in terms of which they can be 
said to flourish or languish. Each living organism has its own telos or pattern 
of development–whether limited, as in the case of plants, or relatively open-
ended, as in the case of humans–and will-to-live may be interpreted as the 
somewhat anthropomorphized expression of this telic dimension.
In a similar vein, Paul Taylor and Holmes Rolston have both located the 
value of all living things in the conation they share, all having built-in 
of God’s handiwork in the whole of creation, and David G. Horrell’s (2010, 129–30) 
discussion of Genesis 1.31, which reports that God saw the entirety of his creation as 
very good.
27 Consider also Schweitzer’s (2009, 173) claim that all living creatures “crave happiness, 
know the meaning of fear and suffering, and dread annihilation.”
28 See for example Martin 2007, 34.
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teloi that give them a good of their own and thus making them ends-in-
themselves. Both Taylor (1986, 99–168) and Rolston (1988, 94–125) urge 
that since we attach value to ourselves as ends-in-ourselves, on pain of 
inconsistency we should attach value to all other ends-in-themselves. If 
we were to transplant this claim into a theological framework,29 we would 
envisage God – like us – recognizing the value of all living things on ac-
count of their conation and status as ends-in-themselves.
An alternative way of interpreting Schweitzer, found in the work of Ara 
Paul Barsam, opens up a second path to defending the intrinsic value of all 
living things. According to Barsam, the will-to-live obtains its value from 
its source, namely the infinite will-to-live, or God. Thus Barsam (2008, 
29) suggests that Schweitzer should be read as claiming that “Value comes 
not from human estimation, but from the view that the human will-to-
live (and all wills-to-live) are of a shared source in the infinite Will-to-
Live. Both human and nonhuman beings have the same ontological basis 
in God.” This of course recalls the old (neoPlatonic) idea that in the act of 
creation God imparts to creatures some of his essence and thereby a de-
gree of perfection.30 To adopt this line of thinking leads us to a position 
not dissimilar to that affirmed by Dougherty (2014, 139), at least of sen-
tient animals, which he claims (as we have seen) by virtue of being alive 
and sentient “resemble God to some degree and are therefore to some de-
gree made in his image and thus bear intrinsic value.”
Thus we have two ways of construing Schweitzer’s argument, both of 
which lead to the conclusion that all living things have intrinsic value.31 
29 Arguably, Schweitzer’s doctrine of reverence for life was in fact developed within 
a  (Christian) theological framework, even if it was not always presented that way. 
While some have denied this, such as Martin (2007, 2, 8–11), more careful readers, 
such as Barsam (2008, chapter 1), have shown how deep are the theological roots of 
Schweitzer’s ethic.
30 A position endorsed by the late eco-theologian Denis Edwards (2004, 135), who 
asserts: “From the perspective of theology, each individual creature has its own 
independent value within an interrelated universe springing from its relationship with 
the indwelling Creator Spirit.” For the classic discussion of this idea, see Lovejoy 1936.
31 Another way of reaching the conclusion that all living things have intrinsic value is to 
argue, as Scott A. Davison (2012) has done, that all existing things have it. In a theistic 
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And to complete the argument, we would note that since the possession of 
intrinsic value is necessary and sufficient for moral status, it follows that 
all living things will have moral status. God, being perfectly good, would 
therefore seek to treat them morally.32 This does not necessarily mean, 
however, that God will treat all living things equally. After all, it could be 
that some creatures possess more intrinsic value than others, for exam-
ple, humans more than animals, and animals more than plants.33 Indeed, 
this is the position of Holmes Rolston (1988, 120), who takes intrinsic val-
ue to be distributed thus: “highest in humans, descending across ani-
mal life in rough proportion to phylogenetic or neural complexity, lower 
in plant life, and least in microbes.” Yet Rolston insists that the intrinsic 
value of living things never reaches zero, so there would never be a liv-
ing creature that would be of no concern whatsoever to moral beings. 
Thus even if we allow that plants have less intrinsic value than humans 
and animals, we can still hold that they have some, and this is sufficient 
to bring plants within the scope of God’s love and justice, and therefore 
make them a proper object of theodicy, along with humans and animals.
It would probably not be courting controversy to say that the conclu-
sion of this argument – and indeed that of the previous two – does not ac-
cord with the intuitions held by the vast majority of philosophers. Indeed, 
context, Davison’s conclusion raises the question of whether theodicy needs to be 
extended to all existing things, animate or otherwise, though this is not a matter he 
considers.
32 And this would be the case irrespective of whether one holds that things are 
intrinsically valuable because God values them for their own sake or that God values 
things for their own sake because they are intrinsically valuable.
33 While acknowledging the inherent value of all life, Schweitzer (1965, 47) himself 
explicitly refused to acknowledge a value hierarchy among life forms, insisting “The 
ethics of reverence for life makes no distinction between higher and lower, more 
precious and less precious lives.” He did sometimes claim that all living things were 
of equal value, for example, “When I  think about life, I  feel obliged to respect all 
the will to life around me and to feel in it a mysterious value that is the equal of my 
own” (Schweitzer 2009, 174). However, in practice he typically placed the interests of 
humans above that of animals and plants (see Brabazon 2000, 281–82). Paul Taylor 
(1986, 134), on the other hand, insisted that all living things are of equal intrinsic value 
(or “inherent worth”).
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one might reasonably suppose that many philosophers do not have an in-
tuition that plants possess intrinsic value, or that the non-flourishing of 
plants is an evil (the conclusion of our first argument) or that plants are 
morally considerable (the conclusion of our second argument). The fact 
that the intuitions of many philosophers do not dovetail with the conclu-
sions of our arguments might be thought problematic for the case we have 
sought to build, for although the lack of intuitional support would not con-
stitute a knock-down refutation of any of our arguments, it is troublesome 
nonetheless, given that philosophers are more inclined to believe propo-
sitions they find intuitive and withhold belief from those they do not (on 
which, see Climenhaga 2018). To what extent should this concern us?
Very little, I should think. Although it is not possible to enter into the 
sprawling debates about intuitions and whether they should serve as evi-
dence for or against a belief, I think it sufficient to note that rational ar-
guments such as those we have offered are intended to defeat or override 
any intuitions that pull in a different direction. Accordingly, we might 
suppose that it was precisely because the idea of all living things hav-
ing intrinsic value does not accord with the intuitions of many in the 
west that Schweitzer and others felt the need to argue for it. Indeed, we 
can construe their arguments as rational attempts to show the errors of 
common intuitions regarding the intrinsic value of non-human creatures 
and to defeat these intuitions. The mere fact that many philosophers do 
not have these intuitions is not, in itself, an objection to the conclusions 
of any of our arguments, then, but rather shows why these arguments 
were needed in the first place. And as a final point, if a philosopher finds 
that the conclusions of our arguments are at odds with her intuitions, we 
might reasonably hope that she, qua philosopher, would not automatical-
ly give precedence to her intuitions over our conclusions but rather take 
this discordance as an opportunity to question the reliability of her intui-
tions on these matters and investigate further.
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Conclusion
Now we have considered three arguments for broadening theodicy to in-
clude plants as well as humans and animals, by way of a conclusion it is 
useful to ask: what might a plant theodicy look like? Perhaps the best way 
to answer this is not to sketch out a plant theodicy from scratch but simply 
to adjust the animal theodicies we have already seen so that they include 
plants. On the basis of the sketches given of the theodicies of Southgate, 
Dougherty, and Sollereder in section 2, two adjustments would need to be 
made: first, to explain why plants (as well as humans and animals) should 
fail to flourish at all in a universe under God’s providential care, and sec-
ond, to understand how God will put this right, or rather how God will 
redeem it. Accordingly, the required adjustments to the aforementioned 
theodicies will concern their treatments of evolution and eschatology re-
spectively. The first adjustment is straightforward. Just as our animal 
theodicists appeal to God’s decision to allow life to evolve through natu-
ral selection in order to explain animals’ failure to flourish (or their pain 
and suffering), one may make the same appeal in order to explain plants’ 
failure to flourish. After all, if God has opted to fashion a world operat-
ing according to the laws of natural selection, whereby certain organisms 
evolve to eat others or to be parasitic on others etc., this would explain 
why failure to flourish is commonplace among plants as it is among oth-
er creatures. As for the second adjustment, concerning God’s redemption 
of the evils of this life, here we have seen the theodicies of Southgate, 
Dougherty, and Sollereder all look to the eschaton, and the ways in which 
they do so can be revised so as to cover plants as well as animals. For ex-
ample, Southgate’s theodicy could be revised to claim that all creatures 
– plants included – will be redeemed, not in the type but in the token. 
That is, that all creatures that have ever lived will feature in the escha-
ton, where they will flourish as compensation for their lack of flourishing 
in this life. And Dougherty’s “saint-making” theodicy could be revised to 
claim that, in the afterlife, plants, like animals, will be deified after be-
ing given the powers necessary to look back on their earthly lives and em-
brace them in their entirety, good and bad aspects alike. And Sollereder’s 
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theodicy could be revised in such a way as to suppose that God will re-
deem all individual creatures rather than just those with sentience.34
I should stress that my aim here is simply to get a sense of what a plant 
theodicy might look like. I  say nothing about the plausibility of these 
models, either in their original forms or in the modified forms just out-
lined. I will, however, note that if one is prepared to extend redemption to 
(some or all) animals in order to salvage God’s justice, then it seems a rel-
atively small step to extend it still further to include plants and indeed 
all living things. To those unconvinced by the idea of plants being re-
deemed, it is worth pointing out that the eschatological models of a num-
ber of contemporary theologies have also sought to extend redemption to 
all living things;35 In recent years, the idea of a maximally inclusive es-
chaton, featuring all of the creatures that have ever lived, has been de-
fended by Jürgen Moltmann (1996, 69-70, 132), Elizabeth Johnson (2014, 
181-210), David Bentley Hart (2015, 71-72), and Bethany Sollereder (2019). 
The idea itself is not new, however, and there are various precedents in 
the early modern age, for example in the work of the seventeenth century 
Bishop of Galloway, William Cowper (1623, 116), and the Leveller Richard 
34 Note that in a recent book, Sollereder (2019, 163, 166–67) herself has developed her 
model in precisely this way, claiming that redemption will apply to all creatures: “The 
scope of redemption is universal because a universal redemption is required by the 
ubiquitous love of God... Each creature that died will have a new, personally experi-
enced life restored to it in a new body, in community with a whole new creation. It is 
the general resurrection on a cosmic scale.” However, Sollereder (2019, 10, cf. 3) now 
insists that her model is an exercise in theology rather than theodicy; her aim is “not 
to defend or justify God against attacks, but to paint a picture of God and the world 
that incorporates the suffering and the joy, the death and the life, the loss and the re-
demption that is revealed through investigation of the natural world and the Chris-
tian story.”
35 In response to a concern raised by one of the referees, I should note that acknowledg-
ing recent attempts to extend redemption to all living things is not itself an argument 
for extending redemption to all living things, nor is it intended to be. I mention such 
attempts simply to show that the idea of extending redemption to all living things, 
plants included, has some theological pedigree and is therefore not an ad hoc innova-
tion to address the theodicy problem in relation to plants.
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Overton (1643),36 as well as even earlier, for example in the work of the 
sixteenth century thinker Paracelsus.37 Thus if it were to turn out that 
a successful plant theodicy required the redemption of all creatures that 
have ever lived, it is surely a boon to know that the idea is not as theologi-
cally extravagant as might initially appear.38
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